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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5150
Public sector pay policy is one of the main decisions 
facing a government, as it determines the ability to 
attract, retain, and motivate staff needed to fulfill its 
service delivery objectives. One option usually considered 
is relying on a single pay spine for all services into 
which jobs would be slotted, thus ensuring greater 
comparability of similar jobs across the public sector. 
This paper examines the single spine pay reform currently 
being considered in Ghana, highlighting the differences 
between the Ghanaian proposal and similarly named 
proposals elsewhere, and underscoring the potential 
cost of implementing the proposal—which is expected 
to be significant. There are three main findings: (i) the 
implementation of the single spine pay reform would 
This paper—a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Front Office, Africa Region—is part of a 
larger effort by the Public Sector Performance Global Expert Team (PSP-GET) to respond to requests by policy makers 
for quick turnaround analysis to pressing issues. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at CCavalcanti@worldbank.org.  
raise the base pay wage bill (salaries plus category one 
allowances) in Ghana to GHC2.8 billion by January 1, 
2010—an almost 50 percent increase compared with 
an equivalent figures of GHC1.9 billion at end-2008; 
(ii) because these estimates focus narrowly on the base 
pay wage bill, they should be regarded as a lower bound 
estimate of the overall increase in the wage bill; and (iii) 
because these estimates are derived from assumptions 
regarding (1) the distribution of public sector employees 
across public sector services and institutions; (2) the 
minimum public sector wage; and the (3) the relativity 
of all other public sector wages with respect to this 
minimum wage, they are subject to changes any time 
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pay  determination  instances  (depending  on  the  year),  in  a  fragmented,  sequential  process  in 
which the government negotiates new pay levels with the different trade unions representing 
around  20  services  in  which  the  Ghanaian  public  service  is  divided.  The  current  process  is 
vulnerable to competitive leapfrogging, as each trade union benchmarks their demands for wage 
increases  against  the  increases  already  agreed  between  government  and  trade  unions 
representing other services.  Under the single spine pay reform the number of public sector pay 
negotiations  would  be  reduced,  with  the  public  sector  ‘base’  pay  determined  centrally  in 























































The  challenge  this  note  addresses  is  developing  a  better  understanding  of  the  fiscal  costs  of 











consistency  of  the  calculations  and  not  only  the  numerical  results.  This  observation  is  important 













included,  in  the  single  pay  spine  being  proposed,  highlighting  the  main  differences  between  the 
Ghanaian single spine pay reform and the standard single pay spine.  Section 3 outlines the modeling 
procedure used to calculate the fiscal costs of implementing the single spine pay reform.  Section 4 
applies  this  procedure  to  the  Ghanaian  case,  examining  the  principal  exogenous  variables  used  in 
making projections of the costs to the wage bill, walking the reader through the steps leading to the 










grade  scales,  while  allowing  those  separate  grade  scales  to  exist  to  meet  the  different  career 
requirements of different occupational groups.  In the standard single spine pay model, after fixing the 










within  a  typical  single  grade  structure,  whereby  the  single  spine  provides  a  reference  for  different 




































sensitivity  analysis  that  presents  the  results  derived  from  the  chosen  framework  under  different 
scenarios (the results of the sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 3).   
The results derived from either of these approaches are contingent on the quality of the data inputted 
into  the  frameworks  and  the  realism  of  the  assumptions.  The  data  requirement  for  these  models 
































































assumption  made  in  setting  the  minimum  public  sector  wage.  The  information  received  from  the 
Controller  and  Accountant  General  Department  (CAGD)  at  the  Ministry  of  Finance  provides  the 
opportunity to rank all public sector employees from the highest paid to the lowest paid worker, along 



















Table  1  provides  the  resulting  estimate  of  wages  on  the  single  pay  spine,  with  the  minimum,  the 
maximum  and  the  median  wage  for  each  pay  point.













the  Vice‐President,  Ministers,  Parliamentarians,  other  public  servants  under  Article  71  of  the 
constitution,  members  of  commissions,  political  appointees,  and  members  of  the  Ghanaian  Foreign 










160  7            19,000           20,200      21,400  
157  7            17,905           19,035      20,165  
154  7            16,875           17,937      19,000  
151  7            15,900           16,902      17,905  
148  7            14,980           15,925      16,870  
146  9            13,570           14,735      15,900  
141  9            12,290           13,345      14,400  
136  9            11,131           12,085      13,040  
131  9            10,081           10,946      11,810  
126  11              8,775             9,737      10,700  
119  11              7,639             8,474       9,310  
112  11              6,650             7,378       8,105  
105  11              5,790             6,425       7,060  
98  11              5,040             5,592       6,145  
91  11              4,387             4,868       5,350  
84  11              3,820             4,237       4,655  
77  11              3,325             3,690       4,055  
70  11              2,895             3,212       3,530  
63  11              2,521             2,798       3,075  
56  11              2,194             2,435       2,675  
51  15              1,836             2,130       2,425  
42  15              1,536             1,783       2,030  
33  15              1,285             1,490       1,695  
24  15              1,075             1,248       1,420  
15  15                 900             1,045       1,190  
       Source: Author’s calculations. 






























Grade/Service  Civil Service  Health Service Non‐Tertiary 
Education 
Police Ghana Armed Forces  Total
1  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0%
2  0.0%  0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2%  0.6%
3  0.0%  0.2% 0.9% 0.0% 0.1%  1.7%
4  0.0%  0.6% 0.5% 0.0% 0.2%  1.8%
5  0.2%  0.5% 1.4% 0.0% 0.2%  3.5%
6  0.1%  0.2% 3.9% 0.1% 0.3%  5.3%
7  0.1%  0.3% 0.5% 0.3% 0.1%  2.0%
8  0.2%  3.9% 8.7% 0.1% 0.0%  14.0%
9  0.3%  0.4% 0.4% 0.1% 0.3%  2.2%
10  0.3%  0.3% 10.5% 0.1% 0.1%  15.6%
11  0.5%  1.0% 5.3% 0.0% 0.0%  7.7%
12  0.1%  1.1% 0.7% 0.0% 0.5%  2.9%
13  0.4%  0.5% 9.0% 0.0% 0.5%  11.3%
14  0.6%  1.3% 7.9% 1.5% 0.6%  13.0%
15  0.2%  1.2% 0.2% 1.2% 0.6%  4.3%
16  0.1%  0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5%  2.8%
17  0.2%  0.5% 1.1% 1.1% 0.0%  3.9%
18  0.1%  0.5% 2.3% 0.3% 0.1%  3.6%
19  0.1%  0.5% 0.3% 0.1% 0.1%  1.7%
20  0.2%  0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%  1.1%
21  0.0%  0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.5%
22  0.0%  0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.2%
23  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.1%
24  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.0%
25  0.0%  0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%  0.1%
Total  3.8%  13.5% 54.0% 5.5% 4.7%  100.0%
Source: Author’s calculations.  












































million)  2.8  2.9  2.5  3.7  3.0  3.0
Change (GHC Million)     0.1 ‐ 0.3  0.9  0.2  0.2


























in  the  calculation  of  the  overall  wage  bill  and,  in  doing  so,  ensure  that  changes  in  the  exogenous 











salaries  and  allowances  amounted  to  over  10  percent  of  the  overall  wage  bill.  Lastly,  to  properly 
implement the single spine pay reform, time is required to collect information on job content, which will 








measures  to  tighten  the  analytical  underpinnings  of  the  reform  proposal.  It  would  be  useful  to 
strengthen the analysis of the fiscal cost associated with a pay policy reform.  Also, as noted above, 

















increase  in  wages  of  similar  magnitude  as  public  sector  workers  were  self  employed  agricultural 




Table 4: Annual Real Earnings across Employment Status in Age group 25-64  
1991 to 2006 (in ‘000 cedis) 
  1991/92  1998/99  2005/06  Change 
Wage Public sector  7,470  8,992  14,120  89.0 
Wage Private sector Formal  6,480  8,054  9,574  47.7 
Wage Private sector Informal  4,205  3,915  6,025  43.3 
Self‐employed Agro  1,597  1,385  3,064  91.9 
Self‐employed Non Agro  3,455  3,733  5,180  49.9 







































































































14  The  high  prevalence  of  informality  in  Ghana  remains  an  important  obstacle  to  improvements  in  labor 
productivity.  Some 87 percent of the Ghanaian workforce is employed informally as farmers (52 percent) or in self 
employment (35 percent).  The informal sector is less able to invest in business, gain access to credit, establish 
standards  or  participate  in  industry  bodies.  These  constraints  are  reflected  in  Ghana’s  ranking  in  the  Doing 
Business survey for ease of starting a business (137
th). 
15 Employment in services and industry accounted, respectively, for the remaining 30 and 15 percent of overall 
employment.   